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Abstract. A quiet accumulation $\mathrm{g}$.fflame on a linear graph is formulated as
a two person zer0-sum galme. Upper and lower bounds $\mathrm{f}_{\mathrm{t})}\mathrm{r}$ tlie value of the
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1. The Model.
The type of $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\dot{\epsilon}1r\mathrm{c}.11$ game in $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{J}_{1}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}$ paper models a $\mathrm{g}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}- \mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\epsilon$ )$\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}$ situation between an organi-
zation $\dot{\epsilon}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{d}$ the taw enforc$\cdot$ ($\mathrm{j}\ddagger 1\mathrm{l}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{t}$ gency. For exa mple, a $1$) $01\mathrm{l}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{l},\mathrm{c}\mathrm{r}$ attempts to illegally conceal
a quantity of waste, and 911 enforcen ent agency tries to uncover this attempt. Another
example is :An illicit organization, such as terrorist organization, attempts $1_{1}0$ accumulate
a certain minin um amount of material f.fi $1\mathrm{d}$ a law enforcement agency attempts to prevent
this by lllealls of a limited $1111111\mathrm{b}\epsilon^{\mathrm{J}},\mathrm{r}$ of $\mathrm{i}_{11\mathrm{s}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{e}(}\cdot \mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}_{1111\mathrm{S}}$.
Now, there are two players, called the $\mathrm{l}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{r}$ and the seeker. There is a linear graph $(N, E)$
where $N=\{1, \ldots, n\}$ is a finite set of nodes and $E=$ { $(1,2)_{\backslash }.."(|1-$ l, $\prime \mathrm{z})$ } is the set of arcs. At
each turn the liider chooses only one of the empty nodes in $V$ , a11 hides ffil (immobile) object
there, and then the seeker $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{a}$ mines only one node, without knowing the hider’s choice. The
object hidden is left there unless either the game ends or the seeker finds it. The seeker will
find an object with certainty and remove it if it is at a node examined. At the beginning,
all nodes are empty and the seeker is at Node 1, arrd the hider knows the seeker’s initial
location. At each turn the seeker can either move to one of the adjacent nodes along an arc
crnd examine it or stay there attd examine the node at $\backslash \mathrm{v}\mathrm{l}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}$ the seeker stays. The hider
knows a node ex$\mathrm{a}11\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{n}\iota^{s},\mathrm{d}$ at each turn only when the seeker finds an object there. The hider
can use this information to choose nodes on the following turns. The $\mathrm{g}\mathrm{a}$ me ends and the
hider wins (payoff 1) if at the end of airy turn there are $k$ objects remaining in $k$ nodes (i.e.,
one object at each of $k$ nodes). The hider loses (payoff 0) if after $t$ turns the liider has failed to
accumulate $k$ objects. By defi nilion, $\leq$ min{n,, $t$ }. The seeker is the minimizer of the hider’s
payoff. This game is called the quiet accumulation $\mathrm{g}$ ame on a linear graph (alvbreviated as
QAGLG) with $n$ nodes, $k$ locations and $t$ turns.




$\mathrm{T}\mathrm{l}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{s}$ assumption implies that the game ends as soon as the seeker finds an object. We give
upper and lower bounds for the value of the game as well as special pure strategies which
assure those bounds by mixing them. We solve numerical examples when $k’\mathrm{s}$ are small, iri
which mixes of special pure strategies are optimal. For the reader the following diagram is
helpffil to understand the game clearly.
$\mathrm{K}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{k}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{t}_{1}\mathrm{a}/\mathrm{R}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{k}^{r}1\mathrm{e}[3]$ is the first of the $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t},\mathrm{u}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{y}$ on accumulation games by these authors. It
treats the noisy case, i.e., the case that the hider can know a node exam ined at every turn.
$\mathrm{R}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{k}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}/\mathrm{k}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{k}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{a}$ [$9|$ studies special cases of the quiet acc umulation games. Ruckle [7] is a good
survey on accumulation games. In the discrete case in [3], [5], [8] alld [9], we can regard the
games are on complete graphs. So this paper is the first on the games on special graphs by
the authors.
Proposition 1.1. If $n\geq\underline{.)}t+$ l, the hider wins by choosing Nodes $n,n-$ $1$ , $\ldots$ , n-t-ll in this
order. If $n$ $=t.$ the seeker wins by $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}$ amining any node at each turn.
From Proposition 1.1 it suffices to consider the case of
$t+1\leq n\leq^{\underline{\eta}}t$. (1.2)
2. Payoff-Matrix and Pure Strategies.
In $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{l}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{s}$ section we define pure strategies of both players, give elementary properties of the$\mathrm{n}1$ ,
alld then pay attention to undominated $\mathrm{s}$ lrategies.
By the assumption (1.1), the $\mathrm{g}\mathrm{a}$ me ends once the seeker finds all object. So each player
does not know previous choices of the opposite player. Hence for each player it suffices to
consider the choices of his(her) own in tlie previous turns. Consequently, pure strategies of
both players c.all be expressed as maps $h$ and $s$ from $T\equiv\{1_{\backslash }\ldots,t\}$ to $N$ . So let $h(x)$ and $s(\mathrm{a})$ be
the choices of the $\mathrm{l}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ and the seeker at the $x$-th turn respectively. As usual, for ally $T’\subseteq T.$
we let $\mathrm{h}(\mathrm{x})\equiv\{\mathrm{h}\{\mathrm{x}):x\in 7"\}$ and $\mathrm{s}(\mathrm{T}’)\equiv\{s(x) : x\in T’\}$ . These are images of the functions
$h$ atid $s$ restricted to $T’$ respectively, and means sets of previous choices in the turns in $T’$ .
Frequently we express as $h=$ ( $\mathrm{s}(1)$ , $\ldots$ , $\mathrm{h}(\mathrm{x})$ and $s=$ (s(l), $\ldots$ , $s(t)$ ). Denote by $H$ and $S$ the sets
of pure strategies of $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{l}\iota \mathrm{e}$ hider aticl the seeker respectively. For $y\in N,$ let
$\mathrm{S}_{t/}\equiv\{s\in \mathrm{S}:s(y)=y\}$ alld $7t_{-y}\equiv\{l\iota \in Ft: y\not\in h(T)\}$ .
Let $a(h,s)$ is the payoff to the hider, in whicli the hider azid the seeker use $h$ arid $s$ respectively.
Then the game is characterized by a payoff-(zer0-0ne-)matrix A—(a(h, $s$)) of the hider. The
value of this game is denoted by $v\equiv v(n,k)$ . Domination relations between pure strategies
can be considered, based on this payoff- matrix. For $\mathrm{f}\dagger$ , $s’\in S.$, we say $s$ (weakly) $\mathrm{d}$ ominates $s/$
if axtd only if $a(h, s)\geq a(h,s’)$ for all $h\in$ $\mathrm{H}$ alld there exists $\mathfrak{l}\iota\in H$ such that $a(h,s)$ $>a(h, s’)$ . A
strategy $s$ $\in S$ is called $\mathrm{u}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ if it is not (weakly) dominated by any other strategy.
For $s\in S$ arid $y\in N,$ we let $ts(y)\equiv fnax\{x:\mathrm{s}(\mathrm{x})=y\}$ if $y\in$ s{T) and $=0$ if $y\not\in$ s{T). $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{s}(\mathrm{y})$ is the
latest seeking time of the node $y$ under the pure strategy $s$ . Since the function $h$ is one-t0-0ne
from $T$ to $N$ , the inverse $h^{-1}$ is well-defined, by letting $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{l}\{\mathrm{y}$) $=$ $t1$ $1$ if $y\not\in$ h(x).
Proposition 2.1. If $l1.=\underline{\cdot)}t$ , the value of the game is $\mathrm{t}/(\mathrm{t}1 1)$ . An optimal strategy for the
$\mathrm{l}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ is to choose one of
$(2t, 2t-1, \ldots, t \dashv- 2,y)$ , $1\leq y\leq t+1,$
1es
with probability l/(t +1). An optimal strategy for the seeker is to choose one in $s_{y}$ (say $s,$ ) ,
$1\leq y\leq \mathrm{t}- 11$ with probability l/(t +1).
Prom Proposition 2.1 attd the condition (1.2), it suffices to consider the case
$t+1\leq_{\backslash }n$ $\leq 2t-1.$ (2.1)
By the assumption (i.1), we have straightforwardly, for $h\in$ ?t and $s$ $\in S,$
$\mathrm{a}\{\mathrm{h},$ $s$ ) $=1$ if and only if $t_{s}(y)<h^{-1}(y)$ for all $y\in N.$ (2.1)
It is helpful for our analysis to express pure strategies for both players in a tw0-dimensional
plane. So, for $s\in S$ and $h\in$ ?t, we consider graphs of $s$ and $h$ in tlle turn-node plane (xy-
plaiie), that is, $G(s)\equiv\{(x, \mathrm{s}(x))|1\leq x\leq t\}$ and $G(h)\equiv\{(x, h(x))|1\leq x\leq t\}$ . Here $x$ lllealls the
$x$-th turn. Then we let
$D(s)\equiv\cup^{t}\{(x, s(t’))|[]\leq.’ c\leq t’\}=\cup\{(x,y)|x\leq t_{s}(y)\}n$ . (2.3)
$t’=1$ $y=1$
If $(x, h(x))\in D(s)$ for some $x$ then $l\iota.(x)=s(x’)$ for some $x’\geq x,$ axtd so $a(h, s)$ $=0.$ If $(x, h(x))$ $($ $\mathrm{D}(\mathrm{s})$
for all $x$ , then $t_{\delta}(y)<h^{-1}(y)$ for all $y$ . alld so $\mathrm{a}\{\mathrm{h},$ $s$ ) $=1.$ So we have, for $h\in H$ and $s\in S,$
$\mathrm{a}(/\mathrm{i}, s)$ $=1$ if alld only if $D(s)\cap$ G{h) $=\emptyset$ . (2.4)
Lemma 2.2. For ally $\mathrm{p}$ ure $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}_{1}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\Phi \mathit{8}$ $\in s$ of $\mathrm{t}1_{1}\mathrm{e}$, seeker, there exists a pure strategy $h\in$ ?t of
the hider such that $G(h)\cap D(s)=\emptyset$.
For a pure strategy $s\in S$ of the seeker we define a pure strategy $h_{\hslash}\in H$ of the hider by
Lemma 2.2.
3. Dominance Relations in Pure Strategies.
In this section we examine domin ance relations in pure strategies for the seeker.
Proposition 3.1. For $s$ , $\epsilon’\in s$ , $s’$ (weakly) dominates $s$ if and only if the set $\mathrm{D}(\mathrm{s}’)$ strictly
includes the set $D(s)$ .
Remark. For alzy s, $s’\in s,$ $a\{h,$ s) $=1\geq a(h_{\theta},s’)$ and $a(h_{s’},s’)=13$ $a(h_{g’},s)$ . So there is no
strict domination between pure strategies of the seeker.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose $s\in S$ is undominated. Then there exists a undominated strategy
$s’\in S$ such that $D(s)=$ D(s) $)$ and
$s’(\ell)\neq$ s,st1) for all $1\leq\ell\leq k$ -1. (3.1)
Since tlte seeker moves to an adjacent node or stays at a node, it holds $|s(\mathrm{j})$ - $s(j-1)|\leq$
$1$ , for all $j\vee--\underline{9}$, $\ldots$ , $t.$ . From this and Lemma 3.2, for the seeker it suffices to consider strategies
which satisfy
$|s(j)$ $-s(j-1)|=1,$ for all $j=2$, $\ldots$ ,t. (3.2)
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We give here extreme strategies which satisfy the condition (3.2). In $\mathrm{S}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}_{1}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}4.2$ , we will see
that a mixed combination of these extreme strategies will be $\dot{\mathrm{t}}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{l}$ optimal strategy for the
seeker when $n=t+1$ and $n$ is small.
$s^{1}\equiv$ $(2, 3, \ldots,t\mathrm{t} 1)$ , $s^{2}\equiv(1,2, \ldots,\mathrm{t})$ ,
$s^{2t-1}\equiv\{$
$(1_{\backslash }2, \ldots, \frac{t+1}{2}, \frac{t+1}{2}-1, \ldots.2, 1)$. if $t$ is odd;
$(2,3, \ldots, \frac{t}{2}+1, \frac{t}{2}, \ldots\prime 2, 1)$ , if $t$ is even,
and for y—2$\ldots$ ., $t-$ l, if $t+y$ is even,
$s^{y1}(j)=\{$
$j$ , if $1\leq j\leq 7$ $+1$ ;
$s^{y1}(j-1)-1,$ if ${}^{t}f$ $f$ $2\leq:$ . $\leq t-y+1;$
$j+y-t,$ if $t-y+\underline{?}\leq j\leq t,$
(3.3)
and if $i\mathit{1}$ $y$ is odd,
$s^{y1}(j)=\{$
$\acute{J}$ $- 11$ , if $1 \leq j\leq\frac{\ell-y+1}{2}$ ;
$s^{y1}(j-1)-1.$ if $\frac{t-y+1}{2}+1$ $\leq j\leq t-y+$ l;




$(1, \underline{9}, \ldots, \underline{t}+A2’ 7 -1, \ldots,y)$ , if $t1$ $y$ is even;
$(2, 3, \ldots, \frac{t+y+\mathrm{J}}{2}, \frac{t+y-1}{2}, \ldots,y)$ , if $t+y$ is odd;
(3.5)
4. A Special Case n $=t\dashv- 1$ .
In this section we analyse the case $\prime \mathrm{t}$ $=\$ $+1$ $=t+$ l. Without loss of generality, we assume
that undominated strategies of the seeker satisfiy the condition (3.1) in Lemma 3.2.
For $y\in N,$ we define a reduced game $G_{y}$ where the payoff-matrix of it is a submatrix of
$A$ whose rows alld columns are corresponding to it$-\nu$ and $S_{y}$ respectively. It is easy to see
that $\{\mathrm{S}_{y}\}_{y\in N}$ alld $\{\}l_{-y}\}_{y\in N}$ are partitions of $S$ and $\mathcal{H}$ respectively. By Lemma 3.2,
$a(h, s)\neq 0\Rightarrow\exists y\in N$ such that $(h, s)\in \mathcal{H}_{-y}\mathrm{x}S_{y}$ .
We can apply Lemma A.l a1ld we see that it suffices to solve the reduced $\mathrm{g}$ mes $\{G_{y}\}_{y\in_{-}N}$ .
4.1. Analysis of Reduced Games.
For $y\in N,$ let $T$ $\subseteq S_{y}$ be a set of the seeker’s pure strategies which satisfies
$\{$
(i) is, $s’\in \mathcal{T}$, $s\neq s’$ , $(D(s)\mathrm{u}\mathrm{D}(\mathrm{s}\mathrm{r}))$ ” $\mathrm{G}(\mathrm{h})\neq\emptyset,\forall h\in \mathcal{H}_{-y}$ ,
(ii) $s\in \mathrm{r}\mathrm{y}$ $\Rightarrow D(s)\not\subset$ D(sr) $)$ $\forall s’\in S_{y}$
(iii) $|7$ $|$ is the maximum among those of the sets satisfying (i) and (ii).
(4.1)
Lemma 4.1. Assume a set $T\subseteq S_{y}$ satisfies the condition (4.1). The value $v$, of the game $G_{y}$
is less than or equal to $\frac{1}{|T|}$ .
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Remark. The condition (4.1) implies that
$\forall s$ , $s’\in T_{\backslash }s\neq s_{\backslash }’$ $\mathrm{D}(\mathrm{s})\mathrm{Z}$ $D(s’)\neq\emptyset$ alld $D(s’)\backslash D(s)\neq\emptyset$ . (4.2)
Indeed, assume that 7 satisfies (4.1) and for $s$ , $s’\in T,$ it holds $\mathrm{D}(\mathrm{s}\mathrm{f})\subseteq \mathrm{D}(\mathrm{s})$. Then $\mathrm{D}\{\mathrm{s})\mathrm{n}\mathrm{G}(\mathrm{h})=\emptyset$
for all $h\in H.$ But, this is impossible because of Lemma 2.1.
Remark. The condition (i) in (4.1) is alternatively stated as
$ls$ , $s’\in T_{\backslash }s\neq s’$, $\exists\ell$, $1\leq\ell\leq t.|s(\ell)-s’(\ell)|>t-l.$
Lemma 4.2. For each $y\in N,$ assume a set $\mathrm{z};\subseteq \mathrm{S}_{y}$ satisfies the condition (4.1). Then $|\mathrm{T}$ $|$ a 2
for $\mathit{2}\leq y\leq t-1.$ Furthermore, $s^{1}\in\tau_{n}$ , $s^{2}\in T_{t}$ , and $s^{2}"\in T_{1}$ .
Theorem 4.3. Assume $t\geq 2.$ The seeker can expect to hold the hider’s payoff to no more
than 1/(2t-l) by using $\{s^{y1}, sV^{2} : \underline{\cdot)}\leq y\leq t- 1\}$ $\cup\{s^{1},s^{2},s^{2t-1}\}$ with equal probability.
Now we define a class $H^{\mathrm{e}}$ of pure strategies for the hider as follows:
For each $h\in H^{\mathrm{e}}$ , there are positive integers $p_{1}$ , $\ldots$ , $I_{n}$, such that
either (I) $\ell_{1}=0,$ $\ell_{2}=k$ or (II) $0<\ell_{1}<\cdots<l!n.$ $=k_{\backslash }$
and
$h(j)=\{$
$n+1-j$, if $1\leq j\leq\ell_{1}$ ;
$j-\ell_{1}$ , if $P_{1}+1\leq j\leq\ell_{2}$ ;
$n-\vdash 1-I\mathrm{l}$ $+?_{2}-j.$ if $P_{2}+1\leq j\leq P_{3}$ ;
$\ell_{2}-\ell_{1}+$ $j-l!_{\mathit{3}}$ . if $\ell_{3}+1\leq\ell_{4;}$
In the case (II) this strategy $h$ indicates that first the hider locates at each node from
$h(1)=n$ to $h(\ell_{1})=n+1-\ell_{1}$ , then locates from $h(\ell_{1}+1)=1$ to $\mathrm{h}(\mathrm{e}2)=\ell_{2}-\ell_{1}$ , then locates
frorn $h(\ell_{2}+1)=h(\ell_{1})-$ $1$ to $h.(\ell_{3})=h(p_{1})-(\ell_{3}-\ell_{2})$ , then locates from $l\iota(\ell_{3}’+1)=\ell_{2}-\ell_{1}1$ $1$ to
$h(\ell_{4})=\ell_{2}$ $-$ $\ell_{1}+\ell_{4}-\ell_{3}$ , then $\ldots$ .
Theorem 4.4. Assume &\geq 2. The hider can expect to hold $\mathrm{l}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{s}\oint \mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ average payoff to no
less than $1/|\mathcal{H}^{e}|$ by using all strategies in $\mathcal{H}^{e}$ with equal probability.
Remark. lt is interesting to compare the bounds given in Theorems 4.3 arid 4.4 with the




There are big gaps between $|H^{e}|$ and $(k-+1)!$ and between $2k-1$ and $|$?/$e1$ . The former gap
depends on differences of underlying graphs.
4.2. Solutions to Games with Small Number of Nodes.
Theore ms 4.3 euld 4.4 suggest us to consider sollle strategies for the seeker and the hider,
as is illustrated in Table 1 and Example 1 below for $k$ $=6$ and $n=7.$ Note that each strategy




$s^{1}=$ (2,3, 4, 5, 6, 7) $h^{1}=(1,2,3,4, 5,6)$
$s^{2}--(1, 2, 3.4, 5, 6)$ $h^{2}=(7.1, 2,3.4,5)$
$s’=(2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 5)$ $h^{3}=(\tilde{/}, 1,2,3, 4,6)$
$s^{4}--(1,1,2,3.4,5)$ $h^{4}--$ $(7.6, 1, \underline{9}, 3,4)$
$s^{5}=$ $(1, 2, 3_{:}4,5,4)$ $h^{5}=$ $(7,6, 1,\underline{.)}, 3,5)$
$s^{6}=(1,1,1,2,3,4)$ $h^{6}=(7,6,5,1, 2,3)$
$s^{7}=(2,3,4,5.4.3)$ $h^{7}=$ (7,6, 1, 2, 5,4)
$s^{8}=(1,1,1,1,2,3)$ $h^{8}=(7.6,5,4,1,2)$
$s^{9}=(1,\underline{‘)},3,4_{\backslash }3,2)$ $h^{9}=(7.6,5,1,4,3)$
$s^{10}=$ (1,1, 1, 1, 1, 2) $h^{10}=(7,.6,5,4,3,1)$
$s”=(2,3,4,3,2,1)$ $h^{11}=(7,6,5,4,3,2)$
Example 1. Suppose $k=6$ and $n=7.$ An optimal strategy for the seeker is to use
$s\dot{.}$ , $(1 \leq i\leq 11)$ in Table 1 with probability 1/11 each. An optimal strategy for the $\mathrm{l}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ is to
use $h^{:},(1\leq i\leq 11)$ in Table 1 with probability 1/11 each. The value of the game is 1/11.
The following Table 2 gives pure strategies used in optimal mixed strategies for $k=7.$ Some
pure strategies for the seeker in Table 2 are not represented by any of (3.3) - (3.5).
Table 2.
Seeker Hder
$s^{1}=$ $(\underline{.)}$ , 3, 4.5, 6, 7, 8 $)$ $h^{1}=(1.l2,3,4,5.6.7)$
$s^{2}=$ (1,2.3, 4, 5, 6, 7) $h^{2}=$ $(8,1, 2, 3,4, 5, 6)$
$s’=(^{\underline{)}}.,3,4,5,6,7_{:}6)$ $h^{3}=(8,1,2,3,4,5,7)$
$s^{4}=(1,1,2,3,4,5,6)$ $h^{4}=$ (8,7, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
$s’=(1,2,j\}_{\backslash }4,5,\mathrm{f},5)$ $h^{5}.---(8_{:}7,1,\underline{‘)},3,4,6)$
$s^{6}=(1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)$ $h^{6}=(8, 7, 6, 1, 2, 3,4)$
$s^{7}=(2,3,4, \text{\’{o}}, 6, 5, 4)$ $h^{7}=$ (8.7, 1, 2, 3, 6, 5)
$s^{8}=(1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 4)$ $h^{8}=(8,7,6,5,1,2, 3)$
$s^{\prime g}=(2. 3, 4.5, 4, 3, 4)$ $h^{9}=(8,7,6,1,2.5,3)$
$s^{10}=$ (1.2, 3, 4, 5, 4, 3) $h^{10}=(8,7,6,1,2,5,4)$
$s^{11}=(1,$ 1, 1. 1, 1, 2. 3 $)$ $h^{11}=$ (8,7, 6, 5,4, 1, 2)
$\mathrm{s}^{12}$
$=$ (2,3, 4, 5, 4, 3, 2) $h^{12}.=(8,7,6,1_{:}5,4,3)$
$s’=(1, 1. 1, 1, 1, 1, 2)$ $h^{13}=(8,7,6,5,4. 3,1)$
$s^{14}--$ $($ 1, 1. 1, 1.2, 3, $\underline{})$ $h^{14}=(8,\overline{‘},6,5,4,1,3)$
$s’=$ $(1_{:}2,3,4, 3, 2, 1)$ $h^{15}=(8,7, 6,5,4,3,2)$
Every pure strategy for the hider in Tables 1 and 2 is in $7t^{e}$ for $k=6$ alld 7 respectively.
Example 2. Suppose $k=7$ and $n—$ 8. An optimal strategy for the seeker is to use
$s\dot{.}$ , $(1 \leq i\leq 15)$ in Table 2 with probability 1/15 each. An optimal strategy for the hider is to
use $h^{i}$ , $(1\leq:\leq 15)$ in Table 2 with probability 1/15 each. The value of the game is 1/15.
Example 3. When $k$ $=5$ alld $n=6,$ the value is 1/9. When $k=4$ and $n=5,$ the value is 1/7.
When $k=3$ and $n=4,$ the value is 1/5. For all of these cases, an optimal strategy for the
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seeker is to mix strategies in (3.3) $-(3.5)$ with equal probability. Optimal strategies for both












$s^{g}=(1, 2, 3, 2, 1)$ $h^{9}=(6,5,4,3,2)$
$\mathrm{k}=4$




$s^{5}=(1,2,\cdot 3,2)$ $h^{5}=$ (5,4, 1. 3)
$s’=(1,1_{\backslash }1,\underline{9})$ $h^{6}=(5,4,3,1)$






$s^{5}=(1, 2, 1)$ $h^{5}--(4,3,2)$
References.
$[1]\mathrm{A}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{n}$, S. and S.Gal: The Theory of Search. Games and Rendezvous, Kluwer Acadenic
Publishers, Boston,2003.
$[2]\mathrm{S}$ .Gal: Search Games, Math.in Sci. and Eng., 149, Academic Press, 1980.
$[3]\mathrm{K}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{k}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{a}$, K. azid W.H.Ruckle:Accumulation Games 1-Noisy Search. Journal of Optimization
Theory and Applications, Vo1.94, N0.2, August 1997, 395-408.
[4] –:Continuous Accumulation Games in Continuous regions. Journal of Optimization
Theory and Applications, V01.106, No.3, 2000, 581-601.
[5] –:Continuous Accumulation Games on Discrete Locations. Naval Research Logistics,
Vo1.49, 2002,pp.60-77.
[6] W.H.Ruckle: Geometric Games and Their Applications, Pi rman, Boston, 1983.
[7] W.H.Ruckle: Accumulation Games. Sciemiae $Afafflema\dot{h}cae$ Japonica,Vol.54,No.1,
174
2001,173-203.
[8] Ruckle, W.H. and K.Kikuta:Veiy Quiet Discrete Acc umulation Search, mimeo. 2000.
$[9]-:\mathrm{Q}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}$ Accumulation Garnes. WP $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{o}.176,\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}_{1}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{t}_{1}\mathrm{e}$ of Economic Research, Kobe Univ.
Commerce, August 1999.
Appendix.
Lemma A.I. Let A $=$ (axy) be a $.\mathfrak{l}\cdot$ XC matrix. Let R $=\{1,\ldots,r\}$ alld G $=$ {1, \ldots ,c}. Assume
that $\{R_{1},$\ldots ,$R_{m}\}$ alld $\{C_{1}, \ldots,C_{m}\}$ are partitions of R alld C respectively, satisfying
$\mathrm{c}\iota_{xyf}\underline{\underline{\lrcorner}}$
$0\Rightarrow\exists\ell$ such that (x,$y)\in R_{\ell}\mathrm{x}C_{\ell}$ . (A1)
For every $\ell$ , let A, be a $|\mathrm{R}\ell|$ x $|C_{\ell},|$ submatrix of A whose rows and columns are $R_{\ell}$ and $C_{\ell}$
respectively. For every p, let $p^{p}$ , $q^{\ell}$ and $’\iota’ p$ be optin al strategies gid the value fot the matrix
game $A_{p}$ . Tlren
p $=(\alpha_{1}p^{1}, \ldots,\alpha_{nl}p^{m})$ alld q $=(a_{1}q^{1}, \ldots,\alpha.,,)q^{\prime n})$
are optimal strategies and the value of the matrix game A is
$v= \frac{1}{\Sigma_{p_{=}1}^{r\iota\iota}\frac{1}{v_{\ell}}}$
where
$\mathrm{c}e$ $=, \frac{1}{lp\Sigma_{\mathrm{f}=1}^{m}\frac{1}{v_{\ell}}}$.$\alpha_{t}=,\frac{1} lp\Sigma_{\mathrm{f}=1}^{m}\frac{1}{v_{\ell}}}
